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dc.creatorFAGGION, Andrea-
dc.date2015-07-08-
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-21T17:55:33Z-
dc.date.available2022-03-21T17:55:33Z-
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/5119-
dc.identifier10.36311/2318-0501/2015.v3n01.5119-
dc.identifier.urihttp://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/72599-
dc.descriptionKant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedru’s fable, i. e. a head that has nobrain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that context, freedom means “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06: 237). As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This being so, it is a right to be held “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS AA 06: 237). The reason why it is an innate right is that it is a “right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS AA 06: 237). This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. To start with, we need a deeper understanding of the meaning of freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraudand violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law. I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedomcannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf-
dc.languagepor-
dc.publisherFaculdade de Filosofia e Ciênciaspt-BR
dc.relationhttps://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/ek/article/view/5119/3608-
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2015 Estudos Kantianos [EK]pt-BR
dc.sourceKantian Studies (EK); Vol. 3 No. 01 (2015)en-US
dc.sourceEstudos Kantianos [EK]; v. 3 n. 01 (2015)pt-BR
dc.source2318-0501-
dc.titleRemarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity”pt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion-
Aparece en las colecciones: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências - FFC/UNESP - Cosecha

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